epistolae obscurorum virorum

Das Lied von Manuel

2009-11-03T19:07:00.002+11:00

A straight line from this to Jeff Buckley's Grace.

Joining the Unchurched

2009-10-03T11:51:00.001+10:00

This is an interesting article by ELCA pastor James Nestingen.

On the Authority...

2009-09-19T15:36:00.003+10:00

...of the Billboard Book of Number One Hits I can assure you that this song was number one in the USA the week of October 29, 1966.

Defeater Beliefs

2009-09-19T10:22:00.004+10:00

If you’ve been reading this blog then you will know that I’ve been recently listening to talks by US Presbyterian pastor Tim Keller. Keller, in talking about how to communicate the Gospel, recognizes the reality of what he calls ‘Defeater Beliefs’. Defeater Beliefs are culturally generated beliefs about reality that will, as long as they remain unquestioned, defeat any presentation of the Gospel.

Keller maintains that you have to show every doubter that their Defeater Beliefs are not simply doubts about Christianity, but actually alternative beliefs, and that these alternative beliefs are culturally conditioned and demographically peculiar.

Keller recently did a survey of a group of under 25’s - ivy-league educated types- in order to understand their main objections Christianity. In order, that is, to understand their Defeater Beliefs. Thi sis what he came up with:

1. There can’t just be one true religion – all religions must be equally true.
2. Evil and Suffering.
3. The sacredness of choice – the idea that each human being must individually decide what is right or wrong.
4. The record of Christian history – injustices and oppression.
5. Anger – not human anger, but the Bible’s teaching regarding God’s wrath and the cross.
6. The Bible itself – not so much historical or scientific objections regarding the Bible – but that the Bible is socially regressive.

In this talk he goes on to give his responses to these Defeater Beliefs. It's the talk 'Preaching to Believers and Unbelievers'. It’s well done and worthy of listen.

A page of Keller's talks for audio download is here.

The Lutheran Study Bible

2009-09-17T09:37:00.002+10:00

The 31st of October is the official release date for the new Lutheran Study Bible, published by CPH. I have a particular interest in this project, because I contributed to the comments on 1 Samuel, Deuteronomy, Micha, and Hebrews. I know that Vernon Kleinig was another Australian Lutheran contributor.

There are some reviews starting to appear on the net. I’ll link here to a particularly interesting one that was linked form Pastor Weedon’s blog.

I’m looking forward to holding a copy in my hands!

Evening in the Palace of Reason

2009-09-16T09:28:00.004+10:00

Recently a dear friend (Marlene Pietsch) lent me the book Evening in the Palace of Reason: Bach Meets Frederick the Great in the Age of Enlightenment by James Gaines. It’s a very entertaining work of popular history, not only because it’s full of musical and military history, but also because it contrasts post-Reformation and Enlightenment Germany wonderfully well through the lives of these two men.
I got through a good chunk of David Fraser’s biography of Frederick, but it is surprisingly dry. I’ve recently listened to a Great Courses lecture series on Bach and the High Baroque by Robert Greenberg, which is unsurprisingly very interesting. Gaines’ work brought Frederick and Bach, and the eras they represent, together for me in a way that was as readable as it was interesting.

Chaplaincy and Speculative Theology

2009-09-10T09:46:00.002+10:00

I’ve been doing chaplaincy at the Bendigo campus of La Trobe University half a day a week for the last couple of years. It’s been a lot of fun.

My custom in chaplaincy has been to turn up at the Student Union in my clerical gear (it pays to advertise) and to see what happens. Needless to say, I have had some interesting conversations.

The most colourful reaction I have got is from the middle aged student who said casually in conversation, ‘I think all priests should be shot’.

Recently I’ve had conversations with a young student who was brought up Wiccan – that was her family religion. It’s been fun talking with her because she is genuinely interested in Christianity, and has no discernable animosity toward the church.

Just yesterday I had a long chat with a psychology student who is an atheist in the Richard Dawkins tradition. He thinks that I’m a shaman selling snake oil (I’m not sure whether shamen do this, but I get his point). I find his conversation engaging, and yesterday, in a discussion about Genesis – and the entry of death into the world through Adam - I got to speculating about death as a particularly human reality.

One of the key passages dealing with the entry of death into human existence is Romans 5. Here it is:

‘Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned— sin was indeed in the world before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law. Yet death exercised dominion from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam, who is a type of the one who was to come.’

It’s a mysterious passage, no?

Now, this young psychology student was asking about how Christians can have this as our teaching, when the evidence is that there was death in the world long before human beings came on the scene.

In reply I went into a speculative mode.

There is something, it seems to me, in the human experience of death that is distinct from plant or animal death. I can anticipate my death, I can converse with a psychology student about that fact that we both will die. And there is a dread in death for human beings that seems to be entirely absent in the rest of creation.

Well that’s all for now. I have to go off to a Bible study.

Tim Keller and Luther on the 1st Commandment

2009-09-09T09:17:00.002+10:00

Recently I’ve been listening to talks and sermons given by the US Presbyterian minister Tim Keller (you can find them here). Keller has been working in NYC for the past years, and has developed an engaging way of explaining the gospel to people who are wholly ignorant of Christianity.

One of the things that has impressed me in Keller’s talks is the way that he uses Luther’s explanation of the 1st commandment in the Large Catechism as a way of exposing the human propensity to idolatry.

Luther claims that whatever we put our trust in – whatever we hope for good from, whatever we call on in trouble – is our God. We can hope in all sorts of things – money; pleasure; power; status. The problem with putting our whole trust in anything other than God is that it will always let us down.

Most people – even if they think that ‘God’ is simply a human construct - are willing to acknowledge that nothing in life actually can fill the demand that our souls have for joy. Keller’s gift and skill is that he can get people to think about this reality. And that he can lead people from there to listen to the Gospel.

He’s worth a listen.

Blinded by the Light

2009-09-08T19:02:00.002+10:00

OK, until yesterday I had no idea that Bruce Springsteen wrote 'Blinded by the Light'.

It's here. And it's pretty dreadful.

I cheerfully confess I've always had a soft spot for Manfred Mann's Earth Band's version. It's here. And it has a certain 70s charm.

Baptists and the Lord's Supper

2009-09-05T10:19:00.001+10:00

This is interesting.

It's Dr Timothy George of Beeson Divinity School's response to the question: “How can Baptists respond to Catholic and Orthodox Christians who challenge our view of the Lord’s Supper as having no deeper historical/Biblical roots than Zwingli?”

Do Dogs and Cats have Consciences?

2009-09-01T08:34:00.001+10:00

C.S. Lewis thought so....

In a letter written in 1955

'We were talking about Cats and Dogs the other day and decided that both have consciences but the dog, being an honest, humble person, always has a bad one, but the Cat is a Pharisee and always has a good one. When he sits and stares you out of countenance he is thanking God that he is not as these dogs, or these humans, or even as these other cats.'

A very powerful argument...

The Flesh

2009-07-31T10:14:00.004+10:00

Recently I delivered a talk that I'd been invited to give at 'A Pauline Colloquium' at the John Paul II Institute in Melbourne.

I was asked to talk on 'The Concept of the Flesh in the Letters of St Paul'.

I thought that I may as well put it up here. So:

The concept of flesh in the Letters of St Paul

‘When you’re reading a passage from the Bible, get the image. Because if you get the image, if you can see what the biblical writer is picturing, then you’ll get the words’.

This was the advice given to me at seminary as I began my formal studies of Sacred Scripture. It’s advice that came back to me with great force as I read afresh St Paul’s letters in preparation for this colloquium, and especially the letters of Romans and Galatians. And it’s advice that I will be putting into practice in this paper.

So up front, here’s what I’ll be doing: I’ll be focusing in on St Paul’s most characteristic use of the Greek term sarx, - a term that is translated into English as, ‘flesh’ or, in the NIV as ‘sinful nature’. I’ll be interpreting the term ‘flesh’ in light of one dominant image that St Paul has in mind in the passages in Romans and Galatians where the term is most frequently used.

What is that image? It is the image of a slave, especially the image of a slave in contrast to that of a free son of the family. Both the image and the contrast are important: sometimes St Paul can contrast slavery to sin with slavery to God (Romans 6:22). But in the passages that we will be looking, where the term flesh is used with great frequency, the contrast is between the slave and the free son.
I will argue that if we can get in our mind’s eye the image of a slave toiling in a household, and if we can get in touch at an imaginative level with what it must be like to live as such a slave, then we will be in a good position to understand what St Paul means by the term ‘flesh’ in key passages of his letters.

I mentioned that it is the image of a slave, especially the image of a slave in contrast to that of a free son of the family. This contrast has special significance when we consider the way St Paul holds all Christians to be in fact true ‘sons’ of the Father, who are led by the Holy Spirit – and I’ll attend to this important contrast at the beginning of my argument.

At the conclusion of the talk, I’ll look at why there’s a good pastoral reason for attending to the concept of flesh understood this way in the letters of St Paul: I’ll argue that as we understand what St Paul means by ‘flesh’ in these passages, we can come to a deeper understanding of what out status as baptized children of God means in the way we live our embodied life, led by the Holy Spirit.

I am not going to present an exhaustive presentation on St Paul’s use of the term ‘flesh’. Instead I will be narrowing my focus on Romans and Galatians, where all but one of St Paul’s uses of ‘flesh’ to mean something like ‘sinful nature’ occur (the other is 1 Corinthians 5:5). I will be attending to imagery that St Paul employs when the term ‘flesh’ is used, and in attending to this imagery, I will show how it acts as a key to understanding what St Paul means by this particular use of the term .
For those interested to pursue this topic further, there are already thorough treatments on St Paul’s use of the term ‘flesh’ available in English: you will find easy to access articles on this in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, and in the Dictionary of Paul and His Letters.

OK, now to the matter at hand.

In Romans 8, a chapter in which the term ‘flesh’ repeatedly appears, we hear words that the Apostle wrote to the Christians at Rome:
14 For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. 15 For you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the spirit of sonship. When we cry, "Abba! Father!" 16 it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, 17 and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him.

At this point I want to make a comment on something that is so obvious that it seems almost redundant to say it. But since the obvious can be most easily missed, I think it’s worth saying. It’s this: for St Paul, saying that his fellow Christians are brothers – what these days we might call brothers and sisters- is more than a metaphor. For St Paul, those who are in Christ are bound more closely to each other than are brothers and sisters in the one human family. That is: Christians are bound in a deeper than biological family relationship through the Spirit of Christ.
This understanding is present also in the teaching of the Lord where he says ‘Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother’ Luke 8:19-21 (see also Mark 3:31-35; Matthew 12:46-50). It also comes out in different ways in the New Testament – for example in Ephesians, where it is written, ‘For this reason I bow my knee before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and earth is named (Ephesians 3:14)- , but here I want to draw your attention to the way that St Paul addresses his audience at the beginning of his letters, and the way he refers to his fellow Christians throughout his letters.

At the beginning of his letter to the Romans, St Paul writes that he and the Roman Christians have the one Father, and in the letter he repeatedly calls them ‘brothers’. Even in his letter to the Galatians, where St Paul is at his most exasperated, he makes it clear that he is writing to people that he considers true family, children of the one Father. There he writes, ‘Grace to you and peace from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave himself for our sins to deliver us from the present evil age, according to the will of our God and Father.’
The imagery of Christian people as children of the one God, or, more strictly speaking, sons of the one Father, is, if you like, a meta-image. Human families are the image of the deeper reality of the church, where all those who have faith in Christ are the real brothers and sisters, with God as their Father.

So, when St Paul in Romans 8 is using the imagery of Christians as ‘sons of God’, he is not simply making use of an image that is congenial to his purpose, nor is he excluding females in patriarchal sexist bias. He is reminding the Roman Christians that in Christ they have adoption as sons, and that they have the same access to the Father, and the same royal status, that the one and only eternally begotten Son has.
We can see aspects of what this means for St Paul in the words ‘When we cry, "Abba! Father!"’. This very cry shows that Christian people have a filial relationship to God. Our freedom to address God as Father – it is significant that the Aramaic Abba is used at this point – it’s presumably the word that anyone who heard the Christians in Rome praying would have heard - shows that for St Paul all those baptized into Christ Jesus are heirs of God – that what belongs to God belongs to us; it shows that our status in God’s household is assured; it shows that we receive God’s commands as commands coming out of God’s fatherly love and concern for us. I could also add that it shows that as sons and daughters of the one God we belong together – we are not in competition with each other to find a status which we ourselves must establish; rather we are free to see to each other’s interests – to honour each other as members of the royal family, gifted in different ways, and called into different vocations.

Now it’s into this basic framework of understanding of filial unity as sons in the Son, that St Paul brings in the image of a slave. I hesitate to say the imagery of slavery, because whereas slavery can be thought of as an abstraction, a slave is a reality, and considering the life of a slave is considering that which is real.
What of the life of a slave? A slave is compelled into service – he does not have ultimate control even over his own body, and certainly no freedom to leave. He has no lasting place in the household, and no legal claim to inheritance. If his master is wicked, he may be forced into actions that are especially degrading or humiliating. A female slave may be particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse and degradation. From a modern point of view we can easily understand that slavery is an oppressive institution, and that slaves must suffer in being restrained in movement, and in being driven to act against their own will.

But there is another aspect to life as a slave that is perhaps more opaque to the modern mind, and yet is well attested to in ancient literature. It is the understanding that serving as a slave can induce the development of a servile mindset. This is an attitude that is described well in one of C S Lewis’s scholarly works ‘Studies in Words’. There Lewis writes: ‘The character of eleutheros [the classical Greek word for free] …is, of course, contrasted with that of the slave. It would be dangerous in modern English to say ‘with the servile character’, for that would probably conjure up a false image. By a servile man we mean, I take it, an abject, submissive man who cringes and flatters.’ But Lewis remarks that this was not the ancient idea of the typical slave. He states that for the ancients ‘The true servile character is cheeky, shrewd, cunning, up to every trick, always with an eye to the main chance, determined to ‘look after number one’, and he concludes ‘Absence of disinterestedness, lack of generosity, is the hallmark of the servile. The typical slave always has an axe to grind’ (Lewis 111). [Patty and Selma in the Simpsons give us good examples of servile characters!]

Lewis makes the point that, of course, not all slaves had this mindset, but that the servile mindset was commonly associated with slaves in the ancient world. I think it’s fair to say that picture of a slave, at once oppressed and servile, approximates well the St Paul’s image of the slave when he uses it in contrast with that of the free son.

So we have in mind the image of a slave: a person who is bound to a household in which they have no future; a person who can be compelled to do what they find repellent or degrading; a person who develops a mindset to get out of the master’s eye, to avoid doing what is necessary, to get ahead by any means, to get revenge where possible; a person whose status in life drags them down inwardly and outwardly.

Now, with this imagery in mind, let’s go to the beginning of Romans chapter 8 and hear how St Paul lays out the two paths of life – the path of life that is lived in the flesh, and the path of life that is lived in the Spirit.
Remember – all of what St Paul says here is leading up to the contrast between that of a slave and a Son. The son is led by the Spirit. It is the slave who lives according to the flesh.

Here’s how chapter 8 begins:

1 There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. 2 For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death. 3 For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, 4 in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. 5 For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit. 6 To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. 7 For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God; it does not submit to God's law, indeed it cannot; 8 and those who are in the flesh cannot please God.
I expect that most of you know that when St Paul wants to mean ‘body’ he has a word in Greek that he uses: ‘soma’. On occasion he can use ‘flesh’ in the sense of body – especially when he uses such phrases as ‘flesh and blood’. Even in the passage that we have just heard, saying that the Father sent the Son ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh’ does bear the meaning, in the likeness of a real flesh and blood human being. But something else is going on here.

To put it most simply, in this passage the flesh refers to the bodily life of a person who is not a free son of the household of God. That is, it refers to the bodily life of the person who has no filial relationship with God; who expects nothing good from God; who experiences God’s law as arbitrary; who fears God’s punishment for work not done; who feels driven by bodily appetite into behavior that is degrading and impure; who stands without defence against the accusations of Satan; who is driven into competition with others in order to find meaning; who longs for peace that transcends this world, but has nowhere outside this world to look; who cannot call out to God as ‘Father’, but who hopes that a power, made in his or her own image, or the image of some created reality, will save.
The flesh refers to the embodied human being in a slave-driven state. It refers to life outside of the household of God’s free children. It refers to life circumscribed by death.

The temptation is at this point to push the analogy, to push the imagery, and to ask: ‘Then who is the slave driver? Is it God? The Devil? The World? Our Appetites? Death?’ I don’t think this line of questioning should be pushed too far in relation to St Paul’s use of imagery – at least I don’t think there is only one contender for the role of slave driver – although as we will hear in Galatians, St Paul is not shy of naming names. Rather St Paul’s use of the term ‘flesh’ seems to me a bit like New Testament talk of ‘ransom’ (Matthew 20.28; Mark 10.45; 1 Timothy 2.6; 1 Peter 1.18; Revelation 5.9) – it can be theologically stimulating to consider who receives the ransom – but the chief point is how the imagery works pastorally.
And in Romans 8 St Paul goes on directly to make pastoral use of the imagery behind the word ‘flesh’:

9 But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you. Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. 10 But if Christ is in you, although your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness. 11 If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit which dwells in you. 12 So then, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh-- 13 for if you live according to the flesh you will die, but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body you will live.

Note how in this passage St Paul contrasts bodily life with living according to the flesh. While it is true that sin brings a bodily penalty – death – and that fleshly deeds – which can include apparently spiritual things like conceit and unbelief – are done in the body, it is also true that for the sons of God there is bodily hope – the resurrection. So the body is not the problem, in fact bodily human life is the subject of God’s saving work. Rather, St Paul is bringing to one conclusion an argument that started back in chapter 6 – that Christian people, who through baptism in Christ share in Jesus’ death and resurrection, are set free by God, and do not have to live as slaves (at least as slaves contrast with free sons) any more. They have no obligation, no debt, to live bodily life with a servile mindset. St Paul is saying that if Christian people live as slaves, if they willingly bind themselves even though God has freed them, they will suffer the consequences of this choice. They will die. But that is not their calling from God; it is not who God has made them.

I can hear St Paul’s fatherly heart in passages such as this: it is sheer sorrow to see children acting as slaves; it is tragedy to see free sons of the household starving while feeding the pigs, when they could be at home, robed and welcomed, and sharing in the good things of the Father.

At this point I want to move across the Galatians, and show how St Paul uses the term ‘flesh’ in the same way as in Romans, and appeals to the same imagery of the slave in contrast to the free son, but how he does this from a different emotional place, and with different methods of explication.

Even a cursory glance at Galatians will give you the idea that St Paul was deeply frustrated and disappointed –to the point of flabbergastation -with a group of Christians that he saw willingly throwing away the gospel. Let’s hear some of this frustration from Galatians 3:

1 O foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was publicly portrayed as crucified? 2 Let me ask you only this: Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by hearing with faith? 3 Are you so foolish? Having begun with the Spirit, are you now ending with the flesh?

One of the great themes of Galatians, apparent even in this short quote, is that the life of the Spirit, the life of the free son of the Father, the life of the true heir of Abraham, is the life of faith –of trust in God’s Fatherly goodness and mercy embodied most clearly in the crucifixion of Christ. And that the life of the flesh is the life of unbelief, of slavery, of death.

Let’s hear how St Paul builds his argument at the conclusion of Galatians 3:
Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, kept under restraint until faith should be revealed. 24 So that the law was our custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith. 25 But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian; 26 for in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God, through faith. 27 For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. 28 There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 29 And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise.

Again St Paul is making the case that the Christian people to whom he writes are not simply people who hold a common ideology, or who have experience a unity that comes from intellectual commitment to a set of religious propositions. He is making the case that through holy baptism the Christians of Galatia are one family – that they have a deeper than biological family relationship to Abraham and to each other. That they are sons of God in Christ Jesus.

St Paul goes on to spell out what he means:

1 I mean that the heir, as long as he is a child, is no better than a slave, though he is the owner of all the estate; 2 but he is under guardians and trustees until the date set by the father. 3 So with us; when we were children, we were slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe. 4 But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, 5 to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. 6 And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!" 7 So through God you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son then an heir. 8 Formerly, when you did not know God, you were in bondage to beings that by nature are no gods; 9 but now that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly elemental spirits, whose slaves you want to be once more?

In this passage we have the same theological outlook that we find in Romans 8, an outlook that St Paul explicates in Galatians by an allegorical interpretation of the Genesis narrative concerning Hagar and Sarah.
21 Tell me, you who desire to be under law, do you not hear the law? 22 For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by a slave and one by a free woman. 23 But the son of the slave was born according to the flesh, the son of the free woman through promise. 24 Now this is an allegory: these women are two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai, bearing children for slavery; she is Hagar. 25 Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia; she corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. 26 But the Jerusalem above is free, and she is our mother…Now we, brethren, like Isaac, are children of promise. 29 But as at that time he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him who was born according to the Spirit, so it is now. 30 But what does the scripture say? "Cast out the slave and her son; for the son of the slave shall not inherit with the son of the free woman." 31 So, brethren, we are not children of the slave but of the free woman.

St Paul, in this allegorical interpretation of Genesis, has been encouraging his hearers to understand their place as offspring of Abraham –as being inheritors of the promise given to Abraham – a promise that the patriarch received in faith – and a promise – brought to fulfillment in Christ – which the Galatian Christians were called by God to receive in trust – with the gift of Holy Baptism as the embodied object of this trust. For St Paul to live by faith is to live as free people – as sons, heirs, as children of Abraham – as baptized people. To live without faith is to live as slaves, as paupers, as children of Hagar – as people who put their trust in the marks of what they can do – which in the case of the Galatian Christians, was circumcision.

Most of you already know that the fleshly, servile temptation to which the Galatian Christians were drawn was, surprising as it may seem to us, the bodily act of circumcision. St Paul’s heartfelt pleading with the Galatians was for them not to enslave themselves by placing their trust in that which could not bring life – in circumcision. In fact when St Paul says at the beginning of Galatians 5, ` For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery’ he understands the primary mark of slavery to be the mark of circumcision (insofar as it is received as a mark understood to confer true righteousness before God).

The whole attitude of desiring to receive the mark of circumcision as a mark of righteousness is, for St Paul, fleshly and servile. It is treating God as a slave driver whose capricious whims can be placated by fulfilling a command, rather than as a Father who desires that his children show love for each other.
As an aside: The contrast between circumcision and baptism is analogous to the contrast between flesh and Spirit, and the contrast between the salve and the free son. The Galatian Christians were tempted to receive the mark of circumcision as a way to fulfill a command that they understood would mark them as righteous – to receive the mark of circumcision as a servile act. In fact the Galatians had already received an adoption in which God marked them as righteous – an adoption effected through Holy Baptism, which was the means of their adoption, and not simply an outward act of conformity to a command.

It’s no surprise that St Paul closes his denunciation of the fleshly, servile attitude to circumcision with these words:

13 For you were called to freedom, brethren; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one another. 14 For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." 15 But if you bite and devour one another take heed that you are not consumed by one another. 16 But I say, walk by the Spirit, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh.

St Paul here exhibits a clear anxiety that the people would forget who they were – that by acting in servile ways they would lose their identity and descend into an anti-community; that rather than growing in love as brothers and sisters in the household of God, they would in sheer servility consume each other. What this means becomes clearer as St Paul goes on to restate the contrast between the freeborn son and the slave in terms of Spirit and flesh:

17 For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you would. 18 But if you are led by the Spirit you are not under the law.

In terms of the dominant imagery, St Paul is saying that the mindset of the son and the mindset of the slave are opposed to each other: the son loves the brothers and sisters of the household, the slave looks out for his own interests; the son acts in freedom, the slave under compulsion. It is only by the leading of the Spirit, only by calling on God as Father, only in trusting that one is a son of the household that one can move from receiving God’s law as burden, to receiving God’s mercy as the power for the life of love.

In Galatians St Paul spells this contrast out in clearly discernable human behaviours:

19 Now the works of the flesh are plain: fornication, impurity, licentiousness, 20 idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, party spirit, 21 envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like. I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.

It is noteworthy that some the works of the flesh that St Paul lists here are not all what we would consider bodily. But all of them represent aspects of the servile mindset at work in the embodied life of the person who does not trust God. St Paul contrasts these works with the fruit of the Spirit, with that which is grown by the Spirit at work in the life of the believer:

22 But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 23 gentleness, self-control; against such there is no law. 24 And those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires. 25 If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit. 26 Let us have no self-conceit, no provoking of one another, no envy of one another.

Now to make some remarks in conclusion.

In this talk I have focused in on one main meaning of St Paul’s use of the term flesh, and I’ve interpreted his use of this term in relation to a dominant image that St Paul uses in the context of his discussion of the flesh – the image of a slave, especially as it contrasts with that of a freeborn son. While this paper has been a far from exhaustive treatment of the concept of flesh in the writings of St Paul, I think that by focusing in on the imagery St Paul uses I have provided one interpretation that highlights the importance of attending to the term flesh for us today.

Of course St Paul wrote not simply to impart information, but to exercise his apostolic authority in calling people to repentance and to the forgiveness of sins in Christ Jesus. This authoritative word continues to sound especially in the liturgy of the church, in which, gathered as the baptized children of God, we receive the gifts of the risen Christ, so that we may be transformed from glory to glory, and so that we may grow in love for each other. By taking stock of the imagery that St Paul uses, we are helped in interpreting our own status as people who have a royal freedom to love each other as brothers and sisters. This is especially important in the context of ecumenical study of the Bible, in which the baptismal unity we have stands in tension with the imperfect communion that we experience.

Finally, a story: In Martin Buber’s Tales of the Hasidim, there is the account of Rabbi Shelomo, who in true Hasidic style asked and answered his own question. He asked: “What is the worst thing the Evil Urge can achieve?” And he answered: “To make a man forget that he is the son of a king.” (Buber 282). St Paul, I think, would have said his Amen, but would have added that the best thing that the Holy Spirit can do is to lead us to call out to the Father, in full confidence that we are dearly loved children.

Who would have thought...

2009-07-23T11:19:00.003+10:00

...that in 2009 someone would publish the Latin edition of the Small Catechism, and that they would have the patience to get together grammatical and theological notes to be included at the bottom of every page?

Not me.

But someone's done it.

I ordered it today from Amazon.

Now all I have to do is find a confirmation student who knows Latin.

OK So this isn't everyone's cup of tea

2009-07-21T20:40:00.004+10:00

But it is remarkable.

You can get a whole swathe of Bach's organ works beautifully played and recorded for free.

Here

The older I get, the more remarkable I find Bach's music.

I first remember loving Bach's stuff as a kid - when I was a five year old I heard 'Jesu, joy of man's desiring'. I didn't know who wrote it, but I knew that I loved it.

It's taken me a while to get into his organ music. It is something else.

Yes, I know it's another blog post on this theme.

Just trust me...

'Why are so many Lutheran pastors becoming Roman Catholic?'

2009-06-02T10:13:00.002+10:00

Here's a short article I put together for St Paul's Box Hill's parish magazine 'The Inside Story'. The question in bold was put to me, what follows is my response.

Any Question: Why are so many Lutheran pastors becoming Roman Catholics?

And not just in Australia? Why, around the world, are a number of Lutheran pastors, some of them leading theologians, resigning their calls and being received into communion in the Catholic Church?

Not, it seems to me, because they have rejected the things that we hold dear: the Scriptures as the Word of God; the Sacraments as the means of the Holy Spirit; even the teaching that we are justified by God’s grace alone on account of Christ through faith. At least in their own understanding, they continue to confess the very things that are of central importance for us, and that have power to bind us together as God’s people in this world.

Not, it also seems to me, because they feel frustrated by a church that doesn’t suit their taste. Many Lutheran pastors leave congregations in which they feel at home not only spiritually but also culturally. They move into churches where the songs at worship are unfamiliar and often poorly sung; where they have no or few family connections; and where their own wishes regarding the style of worship or the structure of church government count for naught.

Why then? Well, let me offer this way forward: To understand why Lutheran pastors are becoming Roman Catholics it’s a good start to understand what it’s like to be a Lutheran pastor in the first place – and especially to be a Lutheran pastor who is self-consciously committed to proclaiming the Gospel in line with the Lutheran Confessions. (Lutheran pastors who neglect the Lutheran Confessions – who deny, for example, the inspiration of Scripture, the efficacy of the Sacraments, or the divinity of Christ, do not, as a rule, yearn to be reconciled with Rome).

Here I’ll simply offer three aspects of being a Lutheran pastor that may help lay people understand why some Lutheran pastors are becoming Roman Catholics.

Firstly, it seems to me that to be a Lutheran pastor is to be somewhat Catholic to begin with.

Lutheran pastors, especially in our own Australian Lutheran Church, are conscience-bound to teach, for example, some outrageously Catholic-sounding doctrines such as that the bread and wine of Holy Communion are the true body and blood of Christ; that in baptism God really makes people His children; that Christ really was born of the Virgin Mary – that He was and is true God and a real human being; even that God really forgives sins through the absolution.

Pastors who in good conscience teach these things are very far from the Bapticostal churches on the one side, and from the mainline liberal churches on the other. They are not, however, so far from the Catholic Church, especially as it has been developing since Vatican II under the papacies of John Paul II and Benedict XVI. The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification stands as a witness, however imperfect, to the way things have been moving.

Secondly, to be a Lutheran pastor is to have an awareness of responsibility not simply to an individual congregation, but also to the LCA and beyond. It is to be particularly aware of the ‘catholicity’ of the church.

In the ordination rite Lutheran pastors promise to accept the doctrinal and pastoral oversight of their president. In other words, pastors understand that however much they may be fond of their own opinions, they have been called by Christ through the church to proclaim not their own teaching, or the teaching that their particular congregation may want to hear, but the teaching of the church.

Now in the Lutheran Church of Australia the presidents evaluate the teaching and preaching of the pastors in their care on the basis of the Scriptures and in line with the Lutheran Confessions. But the question naturally arises: to whom are the presidents accountable?

On the one hand the presidents are clearly accountable to the district pastors’ conferences and the synod. But how does this state or national accountability fit in with the world wide unity of the church willed by Christ? A Lutheran pastor who thinks about this sort of question will at least listen respectfully to the Roman Catholic Church when its bishops, unified throughout the world with each other, and in communion with the bishop of Rome (the Pope), call others into fellowship with them.

Thirdly, to be a Lutheran pastor is to have the responsibility to give moral guidance in difficult situations.

This can be a lonely job, and the temptation can be to abdicate this responsibility, unless there is some clear and authoritative teaching that brings the light of the Gospel into the murkiness of human life.

Thankfully in the Lutheran Church of Australia we have well thought out, Scripturally-based, and Gospel-centered statements on a number of moral issues that arise in the life of any congregation. Thankfully we also have a pastorate that is relatively unified in its teaching from the pulpit.

Even so, the Roman Catholic Church does stand out as a church body that, for all its manifold failings in practice, clearly upholds the dignity and worth of all human life, and calls all people to a life well lived. The Catholic Church stands out as a church body that does not in its teaching easily capitulate to cultural fashions or trends. This reality can be attractive to Lutheran pastors who, through serving their people in difficult and tempting times, are aware that clear teaching and guidance can’t be taken for granted.

Of course, none of these three aspects of what it is like to be a Lutheran pastor can explain why any particular pastor makes the very serious (and no doubt anguish-filled) decision to resign his call and seek fellowship in the Roman Catholic Church. In offering my thoughts on the matter I’ve aimed at helping to give some understanding of how this might happen – of how a Lutheran Pastor, exercising his office in good conscience and conscientiously, may yet take the path to Rome.

The Other Side: Metaphysics and Meaning

2009-05-27T22:11:00.003+10:00

Below is a paper that I found on the internet a couple of years back. I just read it again today, and I like it as much as when I first read it. Anyhow, it seems to be disappearing from the net, so I thought it was worth putting up here.

An audio version can be found here.

I assume that I'm not breaking any copyright laws!

The Other Side: Metaphysics and Meaning
By
Russell M. Manion
(c) 1993 Russell M. Manion

I. ETHICAL NIHILISM

A. NATURALISM

He said he was a naturalist, that nature is all that is, that
terms have meaning by virtue of their description of some aspect of
nature.

B. MORAL CRITERIA

With this I agreed, and so I sought to speak with him. Early
in the conversation I mentioned some evil deed in the day's news.
Some man, for his own pleasure, had caused a number of small
children to suffer and die.
At this point he stopped me and asked why I thought such
a deed to be evil. Indeed, I was quite surprised at the question and
asked him if he didn't also think the same.
He responded, "Whether I think it evil or not in no way
indicates why you think it is evil. Again, why do you think this
deed evil?"
As he had been kind and patient enough to ask me the same
question twice, I decided to answer him in a straight and forward
manner. I said, "This deed is evil because it is wrong and immoral."
His expression was one of disappointment. "I understand
perfectly well that when you say the deed is evil, you mean it is
wrong and immoral. But, this does not in the least explain why you
think the deed evil, wrong, or immoral. Substituting one or more
words for another may clarify the point, but, it does not make it.
Again, I ask you, why do you believe this deed to be evil? How is
this belief justified?"
I catch on quickly, and soon realized that what he wanted
to know was the criteria by which I determined the evilness of the
deed. Therefore, I prepared to give him a number of justifications.

C. INTUITION

The first justification was easy. It is immediately obvious to
me that the wanton destruction of small children is wrong. So, I
quickly determined that the truth of my position was intuitive. I
explained this to him and was quite confident that if he saw things
as clearly as I did, this would satisfy the question. Unfortunately,
that did not turn out to be the case.
He asked me, "By 'intuitive' do you mean you received
insights by some mystical spiritual revelation?"
I chuckled at this and reminded him that I had already
expressed my adherence to a naturalistic world view. "You will not
catch me propounding metaphysical nonsense." I said.
He raised an eyebrow and asked, "Then, do you mean to say
that this is a belief with which we are born, an innate idea by which
all men can know the truth?"
I thought for a few moments. With a tentative nod I said, "Yes, I
think that is what I mean."
He then asked, "Why then, if we are all born with this belief,
is it that we don't all have it? I, for one, don't see the truth of it at
all. Furthermore, it does not follow that merely because we are
born with a belief, that it is true. The truth of a belief is not
established by naming its origin."
He waited a few moments for me to answer. Realizing that
I would not soon come up with one, he suggested, "Perhaps, by
intuitive, you mean that you quickly and clearly perceive the truth
of something for many good reasons that you have not yet made
explicitly cognitive and articulated?"
"Yes, that is it." I quickly asserted. "There are many
convincing reasons for affirming the truth of this belief, and all
good and clear thinkers should be able to see the truth of it, even
though these reasons have not all been made explicit."
"However," he pointed out, "a good and clear thinker
should be able to explicate at least one of these reasons when called
upon to do so. How else can we know that any of these
"convincing reasons" are convincing or even exist?"

D. EMOTIVE THEORY

For a brief moment I thought he had me. Then, one of
those good reasons came to me. I asked him, "Isn't it generally
agreed that nearly everyone, in all cultures, throughout time, have a
natural empathy for there fellow human beings?" "Generally," he
agreed.
I continued, "Perhaps this feeling of empathy is genetic, as
its evolution would be conducive to the survival of the community
in which it developed. Or, perhaps this feeling originates from the
fact that we project our own desires and needs, on our fellow man,
and so, tend to treat others as we wish to be treated. Either way,
wouldn't this certainly provide a basis on which to establish human
value and human ethics?"
Upon hearing my own argument I was greatly encouraged
and became more confident. I smiled to myself and asked, "Does
that satisfy your question?"
He responded, "I agree that we tend to have empathetic
feelings toward our fellow man, but what justifies the belief that
those feelings and that man are valuable? The mere fact that we
have feelings on a subject may tell us something about our own
emotional disposition, but tells us nothing about the subject itself.
A description of one's emotive state on a subject is just that, a
description of ones emotive state on that subject. Do not mistake
this for a description of the subject itself. Do you think that by
believing something to be true of a thing, that you impute that
property to the thing?"
I answered carefully, "No, I do not think that a thing
becomes true simply because I, or anyone else, believes it's true."
As I am one predisposed to seek the truth, even when it seems to
have taken a different course than the one I am taking, I determined
to drop this line of reasoning. However, to give him a glimpse of
my epistemic acumen, I added, "Besides, if the truth of a
proposition is not determined
by whether or not it describes an actual state of affairs in nature,
but rather by whether or not it is believed, then all beliefs would be
true, even those that contradict one another."
"Very good." He answered, "Do you have other criteria
with which to justify your belief that some deeds are evil, or on
which to base ethical positions in general?"

E. PRAGMATIC THEORY

I had already thought of another good reason and had been
waiting for the opportunity to deliver it. Judging that he was
probably ready to handle more I began, "There are also pragmatic
reasons why some behaviors should be deemed right and some
deemed wrong," I said. "The values a society adopts greatly
determine if it succeeds or fails. Societies that condemn murder
and theft experience a higher degree of trust, cooperation and
productivity than their counterparts. Wouldn't values like
these engender lives of greater peace and happiness for all its
Members? In contrast, a society that does not generally prohibit
such behavior would find itself in a destructive cycle of conflict,
vengeance and non-productivity. Thus, couldn't we conclude that
those behaviors that are conducive to the development and stability
of a society are good and ethical? Wouldn't those that are
destructive to a society be bad and unethical?"
He rubbed his chin for a few moments of thought during
which I allowed myself a slight smile. (This was going to be too
easy.) Then he asked me, "So, you believe that if an action benefits
a society it is good?"
"Yes, I do," I replied.
"And similarly, If an action is detrimental to society it is
bad?"
"Yes, surely," I replied again. He seemed to be getting it.
"Then," he asked me, "what do you do when the society is
bad?"
I thought for a moment then countered, "How would you
know the society was bad?"
"Exactly my point," he replied. "Your consequentialist
ethics look to the consequence of an action to determine its value.
This, however, presupposes the value of the consequence, doesn't
it? It may be the case that, if society has value, those actions that
benefit society also have value. But, how does your pragmatism
help us decide the value of a society?"
I quickly thought through my argument again, but found
nothing that would address this question. I hedged my answer, "I'm
not sure."
He proceeded, "At best, an action might be said to have the
value of its consequent. Actions that produce a moral consequent
may have a positive moral value. Actions that produce an immoral
consequent may have a negative moral value. But then, actions that
produce a non-moral consequent would have no moral value at all.
Consequentialism does not, in any way, help us decide the moral
value of the consequent, in this case society. Now, if we do not
know the value of the consequent, we cannot know the value of the
action that brought it about. The question still remains, what is the
criteria by which you determine or base an ethical position?"

F. ONTOLOGICAL REFERENT

At this point I decided it was time to stop going easy on
this guy and start pressing him hard. I figured there had to be some
emotional factor that drove him to evade these arguments. I was
fully aware that my next question could push him away, but I asked
anyway, "I know I asked you a similar question already, but why
don't you want to believe it is evil to torment and harm small
children?"
I listened carefully to his answer. I was looking for the
subtle clues that would betray his true motives. Once identified I
would quickly extrapolate the genetic basis of his resistance, and
the debate would be over.
He answered, "Essentially, this is the same question I asked
you. You see, the issue is not, 'Do I affirm some value A?' That
answer is descriptive and certainly true. The issue is not even the
merely prescriptive, 'Should I affirm some value A as opposed to
some other value B?' Rather the issue is, 'Is there a value A or B for
which I should have any feelings at all,' and, can belief in this value
be justified?"

G. MORAL PROPERTIES

His answer was clear. The clues I was looking for were a
little too subtle, so I decided to be charitable and not use them
against him just yet. Instead, I returned to his earlier question.
"You asked me how consequentialism helps me decide the value of
a society? I will concede that a pragmatic analysis of ethical
systems will only indicate which systems are most likely to produce
efficient and stable societies. As these systems bring greater peace
and stability to a society, the members of that society may have
greater feelings of pleasure and happiness. As nature has
programmed us to seek pleasure and happiness there is a functional
sense in which some ethical systems are better than others. I would
call these ethical systems good. Why wouldn't we call those
things that nature, endeavoring to help us survive, causes us to
value, values?"
I liked my response. It felt good. It sounded good. So, I
pressed him a little harder still. "You said you were a naturalist, but
aren't you being a little 'nihilistic' with your ethics here?" I find a
little pejorative term here and there can go a long way in a debate.
Hardly a moment had passed when he began, "Yes, I am.
In fact, I think all consistent naturalists would be nihilists. In the
natural world we find no properties to which moral concepts
correspond. In fact we cannot even imagine what such a natural
phenomena would look like. We can describe an event, such as 'A'
kills 'B,' as a set of physical movements. We can even describe our
feelings on that event. But, though these feelings may say
something about our own biochemical states, they say nothing
about the event itself."
He continued, "I will agree that if the behavior of 'A' killing
'B' becomes normative, it will have a negative effect on social
order. I will also agree that if the demise of society is immoral,
then 'A's' behavior is immoral. But, just as we had to look at the
consequences of 'A's' behavior to determine its morality, so we will
have to look at the consequences of the demised society to
determine its morality, and so on. No matter how many steps we
take, we will not find in nature any property that corresponds to a
moral concept. Therefore, moral concepts are grounded either
outside nature or not at all."
He paused a moment, then said, "If we ground ethics
outside nature we are doing metaphysics. I do not know, a priori,
what properties a metaphysical reality would possess if it existed.
Given a metaphysical wild card, ethics may be hypothetically
possible. But, as a naturalist this is not an option. The naturalist
must restrain himself to properties he can sense lest he cease to be a
naturalist.
Then, giving me an intense look he said, "What I must
challenge is your claim to be a naturalist. Each time you moralize or
make an ethical affirmation you have gone beyond nature and have
engaged in metaphysics."

H. HUMAN EXPERIENCE

His response startled me for two reasons. First, because no one
had ever accused me of being a metaphysician before. Secondly,
because I realized he was right. Now that he said it, it was clear
that nature can not account for ethics. However, there were some
loose ends that needed tying up. I decided to ask a few more
questions. I determined that I would first ask him a question about
naturalism and then return to the issue of nihilism. I inquired, "It
may be true that if we search through nature we will find no
indication of ethics. Yet, why can we not ground our ethics, as
many philosophers do, not in nature, but in the human experience?"
"I am surprised," he said. "Didn't you feel a rub when
asking your last question? You agree, first, that ethics are not to be
found in nature, then, propose that we find them in humanity. But,
where is humanity? Isn't it also a part of nature? Or, is it outside
nature? If it is a part of nature, then, as you agreed, we will not
find ethics there. If it is outside nature, then, we are doing
metaphysics again and we are no longer naturalists."
"No," I responded, "I am not a metaphysician! I am a
naturalist! Aren't naturalists allowed the same needs and desires as
metaphysicians?"
"Allowed by what?" he grinned. "By government? Usually.
By God? Not if he doesn't exist. By nature? This is our question
isn't it? Nature seems to allow anything that does not break its
laws, but the only laws of nature of which I am aware, all have to
do with physics not morality. If the natural world has no moral
properties, then as a naturalist, you would be more consistent to say
so. Regardless of how strongly you, I, or anyone else feels about
our own existence, condition, happiness, etc., we cannot impute
properties to the universe."

I. BAND WAGON

He was good. I had to give him that. But, philosophically
he was out of the main stream and I knew it. I decided to point this
out to him and see how tough his ego really was. I said, "I'm sure
you're aware that most naturalists are not nihilists, in fact, very few
are. Therefore, doesn't it follow that either you have erred in the
way you look at ethics, or, nearly all naturalist are lapsing into
metaphysics every time they make a moral judgment?"
"That is exactly right." He countered. "Indeed, it is difficult
to find any naturalist who is a nihilist. I would agree that most view
ethics differently than I. But, I suspect this is because they are, as
you say, doing metaphysics, whereas I am not. Surely, you're not
suggesting that the number of naturalists doing ethics in some way
justifies or provides a basis for those ethics do you?"
"Of course not," I responded immediately. My
philosophical background made the fallacy of such thinking easily
transparent to me.

J. NON-RATIONAL

I decided to return to a modified form of social pragmatism.
I said, "But, naturalists do espouse ethical codes that are rationally
based on our individual and social predispositions to survive. As
we discussed earlier, certain behaviors, when adopted by
individuals, will be mutually beneficial to other individuals. This
general co-operation of all members of a society will strengthen and
increase the survivability of the society. As the society's chances of
survival increase, so do the chances of its members' survival
increase. Thus, it would be rational to adopt as ethical those
behaviors that promote the general welfare of our society and
ourselves."
My basing morality on the rationality of choosing behavior
that promotes survival was brilliant. Certainly he could not argue it
was irrational.
He began without hesitation, "I agree that humans are
predisposed to survive. I agree that, given this end, it is rational for
humans to adopt behavior that will serve it. But, what makes the
adoption of this end rational? As I stated before, the fact that we
are predisposed to survive in no way indicates that we ought to be
predisposed to survive. We have already agreed that nothing in
nature can indicate this. Thus, such a selection as an end, is not
rational.
"We may select this end for genetic reasons. We may
select it for cultural reasons. But we certainly do not select it for
rational reasons. I am not saying that the selection of this end is
irrational. Rather, it is non-rational. There are no natural criteria
for determining the value of humanity either individually or in
society. There are no rational reasons for saying humanity is bad.
Again, I am not saying that humanity is bad. Rather, I am saying it
is neither good nor bad. Humanity just is, and our selection of it, as
an ends, just happened.
"Now, if the end is neither good nor bad, and the end
determines the value of the means, then the means are neither good
nor bad. They may be expedient in terms of the desired end, but
they are not good or bad. This means that a given action, such as
murder, could be immoral (in the sense that it is detrimental to the
survival of humanity), and yet, it would not be bad (in the sense that
it has no value).
"Most people, such as yourself, have trouble with this.
Most people believe that the killing of young children is not just an
inefficient way to run society, they believe it is wrong, and therefore
are not consistent naturalists. Perhaps, because our survival instinct
is so strong, our emotions toward this kind of behavior compel us
to project value into these actions in an attempt to absolutise our
social prohibitions. Therefore, although we can apply the word
'ethical' to a system of behavior, we can not say it is rational or has
value."

K. COGNITIVE ASPECT

It seemed there was a sense in which he had a point and a
sense in which he didn't.
"To some extent," I said "you must admit ethics are rational
and valuable. Maybe the ends are hard to establish, but once given,
we can say whether or not a given behavior is rational and valuable
in achieving that end. It is through reason we determine whether or
not a given behavior will bring about a desired end. Hence, it is
rational for the person trying to achieve a desired end to adopt
behavior his reason tells him will bring it about. Similarly, such
behavior will be of value to him. So, in some sense at least, you
must admit that the terms rational and value can be properly applied
to a naturalist ethics."
"Yes," he said "it is true there is a cognitive aspect to
consequentialist ethics. That is, one rationally evaluates available
means to determine which will best achieve the chosen end. And, it
is true that a given means may have value in terms of a given end.
Namely, those means that we rationally determine will bring about
the chosen end will have value in terms of that end. But, it is
important to realize that the value and rationality of a means is
limited to its utility in bringing about the chosen end. Again, there
are no criteria by which we can determine the value or rationality of
the end. Therefore, the ethical system as a whole is without value
and is non-rational. Can you
offer me something, anything, which can establish the rationality
and or value of an ethical system?"

L. NO TRUTH VALUE

I had only a few cards left to play, but I never concede a
point until I've played the last one. I came up with a new twist on
the argument that I thought would really test his agility.
I asked, "Why can't we view ethics like mathematics? Both
have starting assumptions and are affirmed, not because they
correspond to some Platonic reality, but because of their utility."
I'm known for these profound insights. Coupling values
with mathematics would put him on the horns of a dilemma. Now
he could neither deny values without also denying math, nor could
he affirm math without also affirming values. I looked at him as if I
really expected him to have an answer. He did.
He said, "It is true that mathematical systems have starting
assumptions. If the starting assumptions correspond to the real
world, then the given mathematical system will also correspond to
the real world, giving the system utility. But, if the starting
assumptions do not correspond to the real world, the resulting
mathematical system will also not correspond. The mathematical
system may be a perfect tautology. It may be internally rational,
but it will have no rational relationship to the real world. If there is
no rational basis for choosing the starting assumption, then the
mathematical system as a whole is non-rational.
"In an ethical system, the end is the starting assumption. If
there is no rational basis for choosing the end, then the system is,
at best, a tautology. It may be rational in the sense that it is
internally consistent, but it will have no rational relationship to the
real world. Its rationality is formal, but such rationality is trivial. It
may tell us what behavior coheres to the chosen end, but it tells us
nothing that corresponds to the natural world. I agree that
mathematics do not correspond to some Platonic reality, rather it
has utility, only because it does correspond to the reality in which
we live. If there is a Platonic reality to which ethics do correspond,
then naturalism is not true. My point is, ethics correspond to
neither this reality nor a Platonic reality, and therefore correspond
to nothing. They have no truth value."

M. ETHICS MYTH

It was time to play my last card. I didn't have a lot of
confidence in it, but tossed it on the table just the same. "Can't
each individual chose his own value and create his own meaning in
life? Can't society adopt those values on which there is a
consensus?"
He raised his eyebrows in surprise and asked, "Are you
suggesting that each individual should create his own ethics myth
with which to give himself the illusion of meaning and value? Are
you proposing we affirm as a core element of our lives something
that we know isn't true? As for society adopting and codifying
those myths on which there is a consensus, wouldn't we have
created essentially the same thing as organized religion? Not a
consistent position for a naturalist to advocate is it?"
I am astute enough to know I lost the argument. But, I had
a feeling I had lost much more. As before, I could still see that
murder, theft and deception were not in my best interest. They
were inefficient, socially destructive, disruptive to my life and the
lives of others, but they were not wrong, not really wrong.
I looked forward to seeing where these new realizations
would take me. I had always assumed that life somehow, in some
way, had meaning and value. Now, I would have to look at the
world from the other side.

II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL NIHILISM

A. NIHILISM AND REASON

I looked at my mentor and said, "OK so life has no meaning
or value. I suppose it is best to know that."
"We don't know that," he replied.
"What?" I stared at him.
"I Said we don't know that life has no meaning or value,"
he answered.
I furrowed my brow and focused intently on him, "What
are you talking about? We've been arguing this all afternoon. How
can you say you don't know ethical nihilism is true? You said you
were a nihilist!"
"I don't know ethical nihilism is true," he said. "I don't
know anything. No one does."
"Ah! You're an epistemological nihilist too I suppose?" I
asked
"That's right. I am. I don't know nihilism is true. I don't
even know reason is true."
I was flabbergasted, "But, you've been using reason all
afternoon."
"I believe I have," he said, "but, I never said I believed it
was true."
"How can you use reason if you don't believe it?" I asked.
"Because, it's the only way you and I can communicate."
He answered. "Since you speak the language of reason, I decided
to speak it too. Since you affirm both reason and naturalism, I
decided to demonstrate that the affirmation of reason and
naturalism includes the denial of values."
"But what do you mean when you say you don't believe in
reason? What sense does that make?" I asked.
He answered, "It makes no sense at all, but that is hardly a
criticism of a position that denies sense."
"Well," I asked, "how does a nihilist think about the
world?"
"He doesn't" He continued, "all thinking assumes reason
and knowledge. Therefore, all thinking, even thinking about
nihilism must be done as a non-nihilist.
"Think of nihilism as a black hole. Reason stops at the
event horizon. Inside the event horizon is non-rationality. There is
no knowledge there. There can be no rational thinking about the
world. Outside the event horizon we can think about nihilism, but
only as a negation of reason. There can be no positive
contemplation, because all contemplation is rational and this is
exactly the thing we are denying of nihilism. Yet, it would be
irrational to criticize a nihilist, a non-rationalist, for not being
rational. You see, the nihilist may not be able to defend himself, but
there is no need for him to do so, for no rational argument can be
made against him. The event horizon cannot be crossed."
Now I was not only flabbergasted, I was concerned. This
guy really was on the other side. If I hadn't just finished the
argument on ethics with him, I would have dismissed him as a
kook.
"How did you come to this?" I asked.
"The same way I got to ethical nihilism. If you start with
naturalism outside of the event horizon, reason will bring you to the
horizon, self stultify, and deposit you on the other side. Hence,
nihilism!"

B. THE SELF STULTIFICATION OF REASON

I had to hear this. "How does reason self stultify?"
"Well, reason doesn't stultify all by itself. Naturalism, when
extrapolated through reason, undermines the possibility of knowing,
of knowing anything, including reason. In effect, it is naturalism
that undermines reason."
I said, "Naturalism undermines reason? That is
preposterous! How?"
"How is nature connected?" he asked. "Do planets and
particles move according to their own whim without regard to the
rest of nature? Or, is their motion dependent on the laws of
mechanics and the antecedent state of the rest of nature."
"The laws of mechanics and antecedent states, of course," I
responded, off handedly, making it clear I was no duffer on the hard
sciences.
"Is there anything else that might effect their behavior?" He
prompted.
"No, of course not." I saw the trap. "The rest of nature
pretty much includes the entire universe. What else is there to
affect them? If there was anything else we wouldn't be naturalists,
would we?"
"No we wouldn't," he agreed. "Couldn't we say then, that
since the state of everything in nature is dependent, and only
dependent, on the antecedent state of the rest of nature as
determined by the laws of mechanics, that everything in nature is
determined? True, it is determined by the rest of nature, but
determined none the less."
Giving up morality is one thing. That was difficult enough.
Giving up reason is all together different. I was not about to let
him win again. Not on this one. "OK, so the given state of some
thing is determined by the state of everything else. I can see that,
but what has this to do with reason?"
He gave me that look in the eye again. "Is your reason,
your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part
of nature?"
I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was
doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want
to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was
seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was
reasoning with him, wasn't I? I answered, "Of course it is. As you
have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I
would not be a naturalist."
"Then they must all be determined, aren't they?" He
affirmed.
And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct.
There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I
wasn't about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to
make it. "So, they are determined." I said. "What has that to do
with reason?"
"I would think that is quite clear." He began. "If all your
beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn't
it?"
"Now you're stating the obvious." I replied. "You're taking
awfully small steps aren't you?"
"Would you prefer I skip a step?" he countered smiling,
"Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to
believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it
is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your
beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent
state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not."

C. REASON AND CAUSE

Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, "What if
the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn't it be the case then
that we are caused to believe something because it is true?"
He didn't even flinch. He simply responded, "That makes
no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in
naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no
good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you
hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons
given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as
determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you
would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as
a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but
every notion, justification, and thought you have.
"The second problem has to do with the fact that there are
those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the
beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are
determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your
naturalistic belief. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate
between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all
beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is
not the case that all beliefs are true."

D. CHANCE

"The universe is not that simple," I countered. "Nothing is
absolutely determined. There is always a small amount of chance, a
modicum of randomness. Therefore, it is not the case that all
beliefs are determined. There is an element of randomness to every
belief. Since beliefs are not fully determined, perhaps it is the case
that we are not compelled to our beliefs by antecedent causes."
He asked, "When you speak of randomness in nature do
you mean to indicate there is an aspect of our experience that is
transcendental rather than natural? Or, do you mean to indicate
that there is in nature a limit to the degree of accuracy by which any
aspect of nature can be measured? The two are very different you
know. As a naturalist you can only take the second interpretation."
"Yes, I take the second interpretation. That is what I
meant." I said.
"How then, does that account for reason?" He said.
"I don't know." I admitted. "I thought it might provide
some possibility."
"I think that maybe you took the second interpretation, but,
hoped it might have the effect of the first." He countered.
I shrugged, "Maybe."
"Let's look then at this second understanding of randomness," he
proposed. "We believe that within nature any given energy,
position or momentum cannot be exactly ascertained. That all
measurements have an exceedingly small amount of indeterminacy
inherent to them. Therefore, you are correct in saying that a belief
is not precisely determined by its antecedent states. It exhibits an
infinitesimal variance. But, does this provide the possibility of
reason? No, randomness is not the same thing as reason. Rather,
it introduces chaos to our beliefs, not reason. In fact, this is exactly
what indeterminacy does to all complex physical systems. As
randomness is introduced at each causal connection in the system it
is compounded and magnified over time, thereby bringing chaos to
the system and rendering long term projections impossible. So,
though a belief is not entirely determined by antecedent states, it is
primarily determined by them, while a small portion of the belief is
determined by chance. Whether by antecedent states or by chance,
beliefs are determined still."

E. EVOLUTION AND REASON

I may have already told you that I too am not unread in the
sciences. I have a rough familiarity with learning theory, neural
networks, feed back systems, contextualization problems and the
like. Consequently, I was able to concoct a naturalistic paradigm
for the evolution of reason and thereby reasonable belief. I
proceeded to explain it to him. "Would you agree that a creature's
chances for survival are enhanced by its ability to accurately identify
its environment and make appropriate responses to it?"
"Of course," he said, "that's essential to evolutionary
theory."
"Then," I asked, "wouldn't it be the case that those
creatures that formed more precise mental models of the world and
were capable of constructing the most accurate analysis of those
models might have a survival advantage over those that don't?"
"Yes he said, continue."
"Wouldn't those creatures who survive then pass on their
traits and dispositions more frequently than those whose senses and
mental capacities are less capable of constructing accurate models
and analysis? Also, wouldn't those genetic mutations which
enhance these capabilities survive and become a part of the gene
pool?" I asked.
"Undoubtedly," he answered.
"Then, wouldn't there be a tendency for a species to
develop a concentration of those attributes that enable it to
accurately identify and evaluate its environment?" I asked him. He
could only give one answer, and when he did, I would have him.
"Yes, that is clear." He said.
"Then," I said, "if the mental models of a thing correspond
to knowledge and the assessment of those models correspond to
reason, we would have a paradigm for the evolution of knowledge
and reason. We already have mechanical representations of this in
artificial intelligence systems. We have robots that identify objects
in a room from video input and make a sufficient analysis of these
models to navigate around the room. If we set up an experiment
where robots that ran into objects disappeared while those that
successfully avoided objects reproduced with minor changes in
their programming, we would eventually evolve a collection of
robots with an astute knowledge of their environment and ability to
assess and navigate it. In like manner, man has evolved the ability
to form extremely detailed and accurate models of his sensory
input of the world and to make sophisticated analysis of that data.
Hence, man has evolved knowledge and reason. True, this system
is still deterministic, and man is still a part of the natural system he
has come to know. But, he knows it none the less. It is a case of
nature knowing itself. A sort of feed back loop, or self-diagnostic
routine."
I was on a roll. This sounded as compelling to me as
anything he had said so far. I was eager to hear his response.
He gave it. "I agree, this is exactly what we experience as
knowledge and reason. But, this is superficial and does not address
the epistemological problem at all. Would it be fair to say I believe
nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?"
"Yes I think that would be an accurate statement," I
replied.
"I don't think it's accurate at all." He surprised me. "The
language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the
predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought
reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed
reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially
transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material
world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you
have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all
phenomena of nature haven't you?"
I thought a moment, "Sure," I said.
He continued, "It would follow then, that we do not do
anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our
thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to
us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is
an idea that nature has in me. The ‘idea’ is an event in nature that
occures in association with the event in nature called ‘me.’ Do you
agree with this?"

F. KNOWLEDGE AND NATURE

` "I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend
nature." I answered. "But this is in keeping with my robot
paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put
into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive.
Obviously, they knew something the others didn't."
He countered, "The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones
set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don't, don't.
Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the
way? Does water that finds its' way to the ocean know something
that other water doesn't? You see, water simply does what nature
would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory
apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are
caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what
nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the
repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am
simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my
reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are
simply acts of nature."

G. PRIVILEGED POSITION

"OK," I said. "I already agreed everything is determined,
and I'll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in
it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the
phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is
what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism."
"Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural
world?" he asked.
"Certainly," I answered, "No one would question that."
"Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you
than it does for me?" he asked.
"No, of course not," I replied.
"Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the
natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that
causes my beliefs?" he asked.
"No, you know I believe there is only one natural world.
Please stop trying to lead me," I responded.
"Then," he asked, "how is it that you and I disagree?" I
believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not.
Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the
antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spacial
and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which
relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those
beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not
get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my
reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong
only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has
caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe
as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same
assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this
assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we
must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on
every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one
must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never
know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given.
We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism."

H. BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE

I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn't have
much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still
had. "How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in
naturalism and reason."
"I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use
reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I
would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and
nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can
never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for
everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs
in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise."

I. SURVIVAL AND TRUTH

"But how about the robots that survive? Doesn't that
indicate the truth of their models and programming?" I asked.
"Why?" he asked. "Any view of the world that does not
destroy the viewer could be perpetuated regardless of its truth
value. Religious systems that bring order to a society greatly
strengthen it and increase its survivability, but that does not make
these religions true does it? If survivability is the test for truth, then
we would have to admit the truth of every belief held by a
survivor."

J. NIHILISM AND MEANING

The door closed. I was on the other side. I no longer
believed in truth. I was a nihilist. I knew nothing. I now realized
that nihilism is not a world view one arrives at by reason. You are
sort of dropped off there by a rational world view. Then you leave
reason behind. I was excited to hold a position for which so many
good arguments could be marshaled. However, I was disturbed by
the fact that once the arguments brought me there I could make no
arguments at all. I was also disturbed by the lack of values. I no
longer had need to be concerned about being right or wrong. The
problem was that, as a nihilist, I had nothing to be concerned about
at all.
As time went on, I found nihilism un-satisfying. It offered
no meaning. No meaning at all. No meaning to life. No meaning
to my actions. No meaning to words or thoughts. No reason.
And worst of all no philosophy. I began philosophy as a quest. A
quest for meaning. A quest for truth. But my journey had led me
to a dead end. No, not a dead end, a black hole. What I found is
that there is nothing to find.
My quest was over. Not because it was completed. Not
even because I was distracted and side tracked. I didn't even get
lost. I died. I went looking for truth, but, ethically and
intellectually I found nothing. I tried to get out but the hole was
deep. Over and over again I would make a hypothetical leap back
to reason and nature, but each time it brought me back to the same
place, Nihilism.
I sought to falsify nihilism itself, but as my mentor had
made so clear, no argument can be made against positions on the
other side of reason. Nihilism can not be falsified. Yet, an emptier
truth can not be imagined. I had always assumed, perhaps naively,
that when I found the truth it would be meaningful. If there was a
world view that could be both true and meaningful it would
certainly be worth investigating.

K. METAPHYSICAL WILD CARDS

Then a possibility occurred to me. Not an attractive
possibility, but a possibility none the less. My mentor had
mentioned a metaphysical wild card. I found the metaphysical
aspect repulsive, but I decided to take it out for an intellectual test
drive anyway. It seems that most of the difficulties came from my
fidelity to naturalism. Once I was open to metaphysical possibilities
beyond nature, a number of options opened up. What if there are
non-physical properties in the universe. What if there are
properties that do correspond to moral qualities. Then, there would
be a reality to which moral language would correspond. What if
the dualists are right and there is a non-physical aspect to mind.
Then the thoughts and beliefs of man would not necessarily be
determined. He could stand independent of nature as an objective
evaluator and form opinions of it. I have no idea how to decide if
such metaphysical realities exist. Nor do I know how belief and
reason would work in such a framework. But, at least
hypothetically, morality, reason and knowledge would be possible.
This would be worth exploring.

Lewis and Luther

2009-05-06T18:40:00.000+10:00

For breakfast, along with my porridge, I’ve been reading the third volume of C S Lewis’ Collected Letters. This morning I read a letter written by Lewis to Dom Bede Griffiths (a former pupil) in 1950. Here is an interesting quote:

‘One could put it this way: the bad (natural) tree cannot produce good fruit. But oddly, it can produce fruit that by all external tests are indistinguishable from the good ones. The act done from one’s own separate and unredeemed, tho’ ‘moral’ will looks exactly like the act done by Christ in us. And oddly enough, it is the tree’s real duty to go on producing these imitation fruits ‘til it recognizes this futility and despairs and is made a new (spiritual) tree. The trouble with the XVIth century was that Luther – who intuited the truth – was fundamentally an uneducated man, a peasant type: and really let the whole question get immediately entangled political and ecclesiological questions which were really quite irrelevant to it. But the whole question must now be raised again.'

What to say? Lewis didn’t write this for publication – I doubt that it was his considered opinion. Nevertheless it is a curious and interesting quote to consider. Over breakfast.

Different Modes of Doing Theology

2009-04-23T12:00:00.006+10:00

A very few books have had a such a strong influence on the development of the way I do theology that I find it hard to imagine what my theological outlook would be had I not read them.

One such book (really, a pamphlet) is Otto Hermann Pesch’s The God Question in Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther.

I have recently reread this short work, and have realized how much my memory of what it says has been shaped by my application of what it says.

In this blog post I want to spell out an application of a distinction that Pesch makes.

One of the basic distinctions I see in Pesch’s work is that made between Thomas’s ‘sapiential’ theology, and Luther’s ‘existential’ theology.

Sapiential theology is theology done in the 3rd person (or ‘spectator’) mode. That is, it is theology from the point of view of the onlooker.

A ‘sapiential’ theological reading of the doctrine of justification would include a spectator’s description what happens when God justifies a human being: of what happens when a flesh and blood human being, living in space and time, is justified by God’s grace, on account of Christ, through faith.

From this perspective a justified person would be one who does good works – the spectator would see good works naturally arise from the justified person. From a spectator’s point of view, the absence of good works would mean that the person is not in fact justified.

Existential theology is theology done in the 1st person mode. That is, it is theology from the point of view of the one directly experiencing what is happening.

An ‘existential’ reading of the doctrine of justification would ultimately sound more like a prayer addressed to God than anything else: it would include the response to God of one who has been graciously given the gift of faith in the merits of Christ.

From this perspective a justified person would be one who would never plead their good works before God –the individual before God would plead nothing but Christ. From the existential point of view to plead anything but Christ would be to reject the promises of God, and to rely on self.

So we get a paradox: to exclude good works in the sapiential reading of justification would be to deny justification; and to include good works in the existential reading of justification would be to deny justification. And yet the paradox is resolved by the reality: the justified person, who both does good works, and yet does not plead them.

Now it seems to me that these two modes of doing theology complement each other, and that by attending to the different modes we can get a more complete and helpful picture of the reality that they describe.

It also seems to me that much theological controversy would be moved in a more fruitful direction if such a distinction were explicitly understood and applied.

Dogmatic and Speculative Theology

2009-04-02T09:36:00.006+11:00

These days I can't help but feel that dogmatic and speculative theology are natural partners. That is, I can't help but feel that where dogmatic theology is accepted as such (that is, as theologizing about truths of faith that both bind our conscience and invite our wholehearted trust), then speculation will spontaneously spring into being. And I can't help feel that this is healthy, and exactly as it should be.

So for example:

It seems to me that once we accept that Jesus really is true God and true Man, and once we accept that he was really born of Mary by the power of the Holy Spirit, then it is natural to speculate about Jesus' DNA.

It also seems to me that a lack of such speculation is a sign of failure to understand what the Scriptures teach.

Now: I think that serious problems occur when such speculation is done dogmatically. But I also think that when such speculation is seen as wholly inadmissible , then dogmatic theology can descend into a form of tribalism, with dogmatic formulations establishing theologically tribal boundaries, and not much else.

So far the blog.

OHEL

2009-04-02T08:16:00.003+11:00

I've recently been reading C S Lewis' English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, and thought I'd post a few tasty quotes.

Lewis, in the introduction, has a fair bit to say about those who were reviving classical literature in Europe in the 1500s - the 'humanists'. He has a number of critical things to say, such as:

'No humanist is now remembered as a philosopher. They jeer and do not refute. The schoolman [scholastic philosopher] advanced, and supported, propositions about things: the humanist replied that his words were in elegant...The war between the humanists and the schoolmen was not a war of ideas: it was, on the humanists' side, a war against ideas...In the field of philosophy humanism, must be regarded, quite frankly, as a Philistine movement: even an obscurantist movement.'

It makes me think what an interesting specimen Lewis was: a classically educated man of letters who loved making fine distinctions in matters of logic.

Dante, Esolen, Pieper and Ordination

2009-03-04T22:07:00.002+11:00

In the ordination rite of the Lutheran Church of Australia, the central vow that deals with day to day ministry is: ‘Do you promise to be diligent in the study of the Scriptures and in the use of the Sacraments; to pray for God’s people; to nourish them with the gospel; and to lead them by your own example in faithful service and holy living?’

I experience this as a wonderfully liberating vow, because it acknowledges that the leisure to celebrate the liturgy is at the heart of the pastoral ministry. I also experience it as a liberating vow because it draws me into a way of life as a pastor that is fundamentally receptive: receptive of the Scriptures, of the Sacraments, of the gift of prayer, of the gospel, and of the sanctifying Spirit.

If I could live my pastoral ministry in accordance with this vow, I would consider to have followed my vocation well.

I’ve been thinking about this vow again in reading Dante. In the Purgatorio, in Canto Eighteen, are the slothful. It’s not that in life the slothful were idle. They may have worked themselves ragged. But they did not work according to their vocation. They did not receive their identity and their vocation as a gift, but attempted to establish their identity, and to call themselves into being, by what they did. They had little joy, little leisure in life. Their temptation was to work hard in a state of despair, and to miss out on the celebration that God gives through his Word.

Esolen in his comment on this Canto says, ‘Sloth is not the opposite of industry, as late-stage capitalism would have it. Indeed, sloth and industry may get along quite well together, as a glance at an assembly line or a harried bureaucrat’s desk may reveal. As Dante presents it, sloth is a lukewarmness of love, and its spiritual haze is opposed not so much to labor as to play and the joy of play.’

We play when, like little children, we are secure in our identity; and I can’t help but feel that both in marriage and in the liturgy there is at heart a dress up game of identity and vocation that is playful. The unselfconscious joy of play that I see in my children is a sign to me of what life in my grown up vocations ought to be.

I think that Josef Pieper, in his Leisure the Basis of Culture is on to the same sort of thing when he says, ‘The inmost significance of the exaggerated value which is set upon hard work appears to be this: man seems to mistrust everything that is effortless; he can only enjoy, with a good conscience, what he has acquired with toil and trouble; he refuses to have anything as a gift.’

If I were in the pew, I would love to be served by a pastor who considered it effortless joy to be diligent in the study of the Scriptures and in the use of the Sacraments; in prayer for God’s people; in nourishing them with the gospel; and in leading them by their own example in faithful service and holy living.

I would love to be served by a pastor who unselfconsciously took his pastoral identity as God given, and who rejoiced to receive the gifts of service for service; who played the solemn dress up game of the ministry with joy.

Well, I’m not there yet. I don’t suppose I ever will be. But the fact that my vow rightly calls forth this response is itself cause of joy for me.

Dante and Forgetting

2009-03-03T21:11:00.001+11:00

Recently I finished listening to a series of lectures on Dante’s Commedia. The 12 disc series was published by The Teaching Company, and the lectures were delivered by two academics from the State University of New York, William R Cook and Ronald B Herzman.

It’s fair to say that I’ve been a Dante fan for some time. Back when I was living in Melbourne I would meet with Rob Rio and Tom Pietsch (and, once or twice, Tamson Pietsch), to read aloud from the Sayers translation. I’ve recently been reading through the Esolen translation, and have also been dipping into the Kirkpatrick translation. I have Charles William’s The Figure of Beatrice ready to go. So, you get the idea that I dig Dante.

Anyhow, the lecture series was above expectation. It’s aimed at monolingual American undergraduates, and so is limited in scope and depth, but I found it to be very stimulating and illuminating. Just the thing to listen to driving to services or between visits.

Now: One of the points the lecturers made at the end of the series was that, having reached the end of the poem we were ready to start again, ready to go back, knowing how the whole poem hangs together, and to notice the details in context. Nothing particularly startling there, perhaps. But it got me thinking.

I have generally considered my capacity to forget (and I really am gifted in this area) a curse. But upon reflection I have to admit that there is something to be said for forgetting. By forgetting I develop an appetite for re-reading. And in re-reading there is a joy that is unique: finding the new in the familiar. And being drawn more deeply down into what seemed already fathomed.

And this, I consider, having listed to the lecture series, is a very Dantean intimation of heaven. God, who is unchanging, is ever new on every new reading, so to speak. Contemplation, eternal contemplation of the divine face, is a re-reading of beauty. An in every re-reading there is the being drawn into the eternal heights of the love that moves the sun and the other stars.

For the time being, not contemplation of God’s face, but of Dante’s text. In translation. In a glass, darkly. But what an appetizer.

Some New Photos

2009-02-27T15:54:00.003+11:00

This year I've decided to start blogging for Lent. So: some pictures. One of Cesca in front of her birthday Cake (7th birthday); one of Daniel in the Bath; one of Cesca's 'Fairy Garden'; and one close up of the paper lanterns in the Fairy Garden.

I will do some blog blogs soon!

Back to School

2009-02-02T15:09:00.003+11:00

Well, it's the first day back at school for Oscar (3rd grade) and Francesca (2nd grade). Here's a picture to mark the occasion. Oscar is striking quite the pose, don't you think?

Flew to Dawkins

2009-01-31T15:49:00.002+11:00

An interesting reply from Antony Flew to Richard Dawkins, from the December First Things.